EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report documents the results of a briefj unofficial investigation into two incidents at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) facility, reported on October 25 and 31, 1997. The first event was an unanticipated breach of confinement. The second involved reactor operation with an inoperable seismic scram subsystem, violating the reactor's Technical Specifications. These two incidents have been found to be unrelated.
A third event that occurred on December 16, 1996, is also discussed because of its similarities to the first event listed above. Both of these incidents were unanticipated breaches of confinement, and both involved the work of construction subcontractor personnel.
effectively interface with LMITCO management. ATR Construction Project managers work sufficiently close with construction subcontractor personnel to understand planned day-to-day activities. They also have suf€icient training and understanding of reactor operations to ensure adherence to applicable administrative requirements. However, they may not be dEciently involved in the work authorization and control process to bridge an apparent communications gap between subcontractor employees and Facility Operationdfbnctional support personnel for work inside the reactor facility.
The cause for the inoperable seismic scram switch (resulting from a disconnected lead) is still under investigation. It does not appear to be subcontractor related. The cause for the subcontractor related occurrences is a work control process that fails to
PURPOSE
The purpose of this report is to document the results of a brief, unofficial investigation performed at the request of the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Engineering Assistance and Site Interface, EH-34, into two events that were identified within six days of one another at the INEEL Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) facility. The report documents the investigation of these two events as they relate to similar incidents reported previously at ATR, and as they relate to similar reported occurrences at other DOE facilities.
bjective
The objective of the investigation was to glean information that might be useful to DOE program managers, facility managers, and operating staff in their continuing efforts to decrease the number of preventable occurrences at their facilities.
Background
Two incidents recently occurred at the INEEL ATR facility-One event was an unanticipated breach of confinement, and the other involved reactor operation with the seismic scram subsystem inoperable that violated the facility's Technical Specifications. It appeared on the surfke that the two events had similarities in cause, and it was noted that at least one other similar event had occurred within the past year at the same facility.
Method and Scope
The investigation into the two ATR events was performed by detailed reviews of occurrence reports, augmented by discussions with personnel responsible for various aspects of safely operating the ATR facility. The investigation was performed by two people, each having some detailed knowledge of the ATR Eidity, and one involved on a day-to-day basis in reviewing occurrences reported by operating personnel fiom across the DOE complex.
The latter performs these reviews for the Defense Programs Office of the Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Technical and Environmental Support, DP-45, Special Projects Group.
A Special Projects Group team reviews all occurrence reports issued by DOE facilities on a daily basis. During this daily review, occurrence reports are discussed for assignment to subject matter bins and sub-bins and for classification as significant reports'. This information is entered into a database program and is used in biweekly and bimonthly reports disseminated throughout the DOE complex for use by operating personnel. Analysis of data has shown that a large number of significant occurrence reports is recorded in the OSHA/-IAstriaI Hygiene and Subconpactor subject matter bins. For example, approximately 94% of the occurrences recorded under the OSHMIndustrial Hygiene subject matter bin are attributable to subcontractor activities. For the last five months (or eleven two-week periods), an average of 24% of the sigdicant reports fiom alJ DOE facilities have fallen into the Subcontractor bin.
An occurrence report is considered to be signrScant if the event has particular safety, political, or cost implications. For example, a report is assigned a medium significance if only one barrier to significant injury or exposure remained; if out-patient hospitalization occurred for observation or treatment; or ifsigruficant costs were incurred that exceeded the reporting threshold of DOE Order 232.1A. It is assigned a high sigdicance ifthe occurrence was life threatening or a fatality; ifthe event was politically sensitive; if the incident involved a major release affecting the environment or an uncontrollable situation, i.e., major fire, flood, or if hospitalization for more than observation was required. Description Of Occurrence Report A Lead Senior Reactor Auxiliary Operator while completing a walkdown of changes to the plant facility being made by a construction subcontractor, noticed that five 1-10 in. pipes that penetrated the Reactor Data Acquisition System and Reactor Instrument shop rooms were open. A construction subcontractor had recently removed the Halon System distribution piping that connected the halon gas supply bottles outside the ATR reactor building and the eight spiral discharge nozzles inside the building. The Operator understood that the spiral discharge nozzles were open inside the ATR gas conhement and that, if the distribution piping were not sealed, it would breach the gas-tight confinement boundary for the reactor. The Operator reported his concern to the Shift Supervisor.
This information is depicted below
The opening through the reactor building confinement wall was within the Technical Specification allowable limit of 7 in.2. However, work controls for construction subcontractors' work were not effective in preventing the ATR gas-tight confinement from being inadvertently breached. Maintaining gas-tight confinement within allowable leakage limits specified in the ATR Technical Specifications is important to prevent a serious radiological release from the ATR building.
Review Of Causes
The causes of this occurrence seem to be twofold. The first is a lack of recognition by any of the parties involved that the work would breach confinement. This is an error that occurs occasionally and is not unique. The other cause is more subtle and reflects the limited interface between the plant staff and construction subcontractors and other differences in the two organizations.
Maintenance activities at the ATR and other nuclear facilities at the INEEL are conducted by Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies Company (TMlTCO) employees per Management Control Procedure MCP-2798 that defines Maintenance Work Control for LMITCO and non-Davis-Bacon personnel. This procedure requires rigor, multi-level control, and verification that is typical of the controls used in the rest of the nuclear reactor industry.
Subcontractor construction work within the facility is carefully planned and reviewed with the LMITCO Construction Engineer each day, but the details and requirements are not normally as well documented as they are for work performed by the LMITCO maintenance crafts. As such, other LMITCO personnel, who are in the approval process for authorizing and/or overseeing the hctional aspects of the work, do not always understand the dayto-day details well enough to prevent errors, e.g., removal of sealant without the proper authorization, failure to rigorously follow instructions on caution tags, methods for ensuring fall protection requirements are adhered to, methods for attaching unistrut to buildmglcrane support columns are authorized, etc.
The differences in the two types of work control programs are driven by the differences in the type of work. In-plant maintenance is performed with a staff well trained in safe plant operation and the jobs are commonly repetitive in nature (e.g., calibrations, PMs, and overhauls) that easily accommodate detailed procedures. Subcontractor work typically is a variable activity (e.g., construction and D&D) using building trade labor with minimal training time available. The training emphasis also differs between "skill-of-thetrade" versus "operation of the plant". If the subcontractor were forced to change his work control process to that of the LMITCO client, (eg., step by step procedures) the scope of work would increase dramatically, and the advantage of usiig a skill based subcontractor would be lost.
As a result of this occurrence and a similar event fi-om last year (ID--LITC-ATR-1996-003 1) and discussed later in this report, Construction Management personnel are creating some recommendations for improving the interface between subcontractors and ATR Operations.
Occurrence Report Number ID-L1TC-ATR-1997-0022-Discovery of a Disconnected Electrical Lead on Seismic Scram Switch

Description Of Occurrence Report
At 0745 on 10/3 1/97, while an ATR Operations stamember was performing an assessment, he was shown the location of the ATRC seismic scram switch (detector) and noted that one of the two leads on the detector was disconnected.
The disconnected lead rendered the seismic scram function for the ATRC inoperable. This subsystem is required by the facility Technical Specifications to be finctional during reactor operation. On October 21,1997 and October 22, 1997 preventive maintenance was performed using approved procedures that could have revealed or caused the disconnected electrical lead. The electrical lead is secured to the seismic switch by means of a knurled nut that has to be tightened over the lead wire loop. The entire switch assembly is then covered by a box lid that prevents dirt &om entering the switch assembly and protects it from damage. When questioned, all ATRC operators stated that they had not noticed the lifted lead and that the seismic switch material condition was satisfactory. Likewise, construction personnel, who were installing conduit for an upgraded security access system, denied having done anything to the switch that might have caused the lead to come OE ATRC is a locked facility with limited access. At the time of this notification report, the cause of the lifted lead is unknown. The reactor had been operated on three occasions since October 22, 1997. An investigation is being performed to attempt to determine the cause of the inoperable seismic switch. A corrective action plan will be developed to resolve the findings fiom the investigation. The facility will remain shut down until the results of the investigation and completion of the correction action are reviewed by facility management and DOE-ID.
Review Of Causes
The exact cause of this event is unknown at this time. Because the seismic switch is covered by a box lid and the leads are firmly attached to the switch by means of a heavy knurled nut, this event does not appear to be construction related. In fact, no subcontractor personnel were logged into the area during the interval since the last PM.
Occurrence Report Number ID-LITC-Am-1996-0031-Removal Of Temporary Seal fiom %in. Reactor Confinement Penetration by Construction Subcontractor Without Proper Approval [A previous occurrence report of an incident very similar to the first event described above (ID--LITC-ATR-1997-0021) was reported in December 1996. It is described in the following paragraphs].
Description Of Occurrence Report
While pulling wires through a 2-in. electrical conduit, in support of a construction project, an Electrical Apprentice removed a temporary seal fiom the electrical conduit without obtaining proper authorization from the Operations Shift Supervisor or having processed the required Reactor Programs Penetration Approval Form. The previously installed and sealed 2-in. conduit penetrated a reactor confinement boundary wall.
During the morning on December 16, 1996, the Construction Subcontractor Electrical Foreman and the LMITCO Construction Project Engineer met with the Operations ShiR Supervisor and briefed him on what construction work would be ongoing within the ATR facility. The Shift Supervisor was not aware that this was the first day on the job for the sub-tier Electrical Subcontractor and believed that the primary Subcontractor would process the necessary --Tight Penetration Approval Form prior to removing any seals in conduit that penetrated the ATR gas-tight boundary, as he had before.
Late in the morning, the Subcontractor Electrical Foreman instructed an Electrical Apprentice to remove the temporary sealant from the 2-in. conduit and pull wire through it. The 5 Electrical Foreman believed that based on the morning briefing, he had obtained verbal Shift Supervisor approval to proceed with that task. He was not aware of the need to formally process a Gas-Tight Penetration Approval Form because the primary subcontractor Superintendent had always performed that fbnction in the past. Caution tags had previously been hung on the conduit, only a few inches away from the temporary sealant, referencing the ATR Technical Specification and warning that removal of the temporary sealant was prohibited. The Electrical Apprentice was aware of the caution tags, but thought that the Shift Supervisor had given authorization to remove the seal and proceeded without contacting the Shift Supervisor.
Upon completion of the wire pull through and the 2-in. conduit penetration, Construction Subcontractor personnel recognized the need to have the temporary seal inspected. When the Shift Supervisor was contacted to perform this inspection, he recognized that the Penetration Approval Form had not been processed, and requested that any krther work on pulling wire through the conduit be stopped. Other Subcontractor work was allowed to continue.
Description Of Cause
The direct cause of this event is a communication problem. The early morning Shift Supervisor briehg was very broad-based. The Shift Supervisor understood that wire pulls would be performed, but also expected that the Penetration Approval Form would be processed by the Construction Management and Subcontractor personnel, as it had been hundreds of times before.
The Subcontractor Superintendent understood the need to formally process the Penetration Approval Form for drilling holes through the confinement, and had done so numerous times in the past, but did not process the form for the sub-tier Electrical Subcontractor, primarily due to inattention to detail, but also because he had not followed through on a question as to whether processing the form was required for only temporary removal of the conduit sealant, as opposed to the requirement for using the form for any drilling through confinement.
LMITCO Construction personnel were filly aware of the need to process the Penetration Approval Forms, but like the Shift Supervisor, believed that the sub-tier Electrical Subcontractor was aware of the requirement and expected the form to be processed prior to removing the sealant from the electrical conduit.
The Electrical Apprentice indicated in a written statement that he had read the caution tag, but believed that his actions were allowed, even though they were not consistent with caution tag instructions. This belief was based on having received direction from his Electrical Foreman to proceed and knowing that a Shift Supervisor briefing had occurred that morning, w i t h an approval to commence work.
Initially this event was believed to be an isolated case and the root cause was identified as "Training Deficiency, Lack of Appropriate Training." The primary Subcontractor Superintendent indicated that the form had always been processed at his level, and above. The Electrical Apprentice was also not fblly aware of the need to rigorously follow the caution tag instructions within the reactor facility, and ifhe could not, to request that the caution tag be removed.
Subsequent related occurrences at ATR (ID--LITC-ATR-l997-0001 on February 6, 1997 and ID--LITC-ATR-1997-0008 on March 4, 1997) indicate that this event was not an isolated case and that the real root cause was lack of construction subcontractor work control.
Evaluation
The Subcontractor failed to comply with the work control process. This was not an intentional error, rather a lack of attention to detail on the part of the Electrical Superintendent, and a lack of training for the Electrical Foreman and the Electrical Apprentice. The pre-job briefing between the Subcontractor and the Shift Supervisor was broad-based and did not cover the specific approval forms that were necessary before removing gas-tight penetration seals. The Shift Supervisor believed it to be unnecessarily repetitious to reiterate the need for processing the same form that the Subcontractor had used more than a hundred times before.
The breach opening through the reactor building confinement wall was well within the allowable Technical Specification limit of 7-h2, and there would have been no impact to the environment beyond that identified in the Reactor Authorization Basis, even if a serious radiological airborne release had occurred during the short time that the conduit sealant was removed. The Technical Specification action statement allowed openings greater than 7-in2 to be created, as long as the openings were verified to be reduced to less than 7-in.? within 24 hours.
Airborne activity levels were normal while this work was in progress and, in fact, would have precluded any construction work inside the reactor confinement if they had been elevated.
There are numerous ways that the construction subcontractor can affect the safety of the hcility. Construction work within the facility is carefully planned and reviewed with the LMTTCO Construction Engineer each day, but the task specific details are not normally as well documented as for maintenance crafts. Construction personnel typically work to drawings and not detailed work instructions like maintenance craft personnel. As such, an important form of communication is not available; and this makes it difficult for facility operations and other functional TRA support groups to review the details of planned construction work activities and to provide input to construction subcontractors concerning applicable administrative restrictions.
CONCLUSIONS
The fact that two almost identical incidents (i.e., a subcontractor opening a penetration into the reactor's confinement structure) have occurred within a year's time, indicates that IMlTCO's work control processes for subcontractor work are not preventing these occurrences. TRA Construction Project managers work sufficiently close with construction subcontractor personnel to understand planned day-to-day activities. They also have sufficient traininglunderstandmg of reactor operations to ensure adherence to applicable administrative requirements. However, they may not be mfliciently involved in the work authorization and control process to bridge an apparent communications gap between subcontractor employees and Facility Operationdhnctional support personnel for work inside the reactor facility. This problem is not specific to the INEEL or ATR; it is occurring throughout the DOE complex on quite a regular basis. One of the underlying reasons for the number of safety and procedure violations of subcontract workers is that the safety culture of subcontractors is not equivalent to that of the DOE community. Since most subcontractors' activities involve construction work, this deficiency is a result of a lack of consistent safety training and a lack of understanding of plant system operation inherent to a building trades workforce.
Inadequate supervision by the DOE M&O or construction contractors also contributes to the number of OSHA-related incidents.
LESSONS LEARNED
Construction work is often composed of oneof-a-kind activities that do not lend themselves readily to being organized into standard procedures as surveillance, maintenance, calibration, or overhaul activities do. Additionally, construction work in existing facilities often involves a change in configuration, i.e., a removal of one system or a replacement by another system. As such, exact work planning is almost impossible and probably not cost effective. The contractor must have enough freedom to apply his expertise to the completion of the task, while the facility's construction engineer must make sure that the facility's Operational Safety Requirements or Technical Specifications are not violated. A successful project completion depends to a large extent upon the trust and communication between the facility's construction engineer, the construction contractor supervisor and the operations st&.
While good communications between the construction engineer and the ATR Shift Supervisor is vital to safety, the act of communicating also tends to become merely one of their many routine duties. In many instances, this communications interface .becomes the source of misunderstanding.
The most effective tool of establishing a communication channel between the construction engineer and the construction subcontractor is the pre-job briefing. It is the construction engineer's responsibility to ensure that the construction subcontractor understands all requirements of the assigned tasks.
After a long history of these types of problems, the INEEL Procurement Department has now issued a Subcontractor Requirements Manual that will become a requirement for all fiture contracts. This manual includes requirements for QA, safety, work control, and other programs that are equivalent to the INEEL internal procedures. It is expected that this new manual will go a long way to end the double standard that now exists. (The manual can be viewed at http://www.inel.gov/procurement/litco/ index.htm1). At approximately 1120 hours on June 24,1996, a trackhoe, operated by a construction subcontractor, struck an overhead power line to a pole-mounted siren. As a result, the weather head (circuit) pulled away from building 670 approximately two to three inches. The power line now sags five to six feet lower than it did originally. The electrical service (240V) was deenergized at the time of the occurrence, but not locked and tagged out
APPENDIX
Referenced Occurrence Reports
The trackhoe was removing asphalt and loading it into a dump truck at the time of the incident. A spotter for the trackhoe operator was being utilized, but he was also helping to load the trackhoe bucket by hand.
The evacuation siren was not activated as a result of this incident; therefore, no evacuation of personnel occurred.
OPERATING CONDITIONS OF FACILITY AT TIME OF OCCURRENCE:
The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) was shutdown for the scheduled Cycle The direct cause was determined to be Operator Error, Inattention to Detail. Both the trackhoe operator and the safety spotter failed to realize the significance of the overhead power line and its close proximity to the trackhoe.
The operator was in the process of loading asphalt into a dump truck for removal from the area when this incident occurred. During this operation, the boom hinge point of the trackhoe was extended to its highest point, when it came into contact with the electrical service line to the siren. The safety spotter had temporarily left his position to assist the trackhoe operator in loading an oversized piece of material (asphalt) into the bucket and failed to observe the hazard of the trackhoe boom raising.
The root cause of this event is a Management Problem in that administrative controls for the job were inadequate for the hazards involved. The job safety analysis addressed an overhead line, but it failed to place the proper emphasis on the hazard associated with the line. The Construction Management Excavation Checklist, as utilized, placed an emphasis on underground hazards and failed to address aboveground hazards. It was assumed that because the overhead line was visible to all, that everybody recognized the hazard. If the job safety analysis, pre-job briefing, and the Construction Management Excavation Checklist had acknowledged the hazard, then this event would not have occurred.
EVALUATION: (By Facility Managermesignee)
A potential for personnel injury existed during this incident, due to the trackhoe coming into contact with the 240V electrical service line; however, the service line was deenergized at the time of the occurrence.
To help prevent events like this one from recurring, the job safety analysis process will be reevaluated and revised. Additionally, the Construction Management Excavation Checklist has been revised to include above-ground hazards; pre-job briefings now include safety spotter responsibilities. (continued) laying out wires, etc. They also understood that wire pulls that would require disturbing gas tight penetration seals (a putty type substance that had been placed inside the previously installed electrical conduit) would be necessary later in the day. The Shift Supervisor was not aware that this was the first day on the job for the sub-tier Electrical Subcontractor and believed that the primary Subcontractor would process the necessary Gas Tight Penetration Approval Form prior to removing any seals in conduit that penetrated the ATR gas tight boundary, as he had before.
Removal of seals of any size through an ATR facil'ky wall is a sensitive evolution, since the reactor confinement is one of the Technical Specification barriers that is designed to limit air leakage from the reactor building in case of a significant airborne radiological release within the building. A Reactor Programs-specific Gas Tight Approval Form was in place to control that kind of work activ'w; the Construction Subcontractor (but not the sub-tier Electrical Subcontractor) had used the form in excess of a hundred times during the past several months for obtaining formal authorization to drill and install pipelconduit through gas tight penetrations.
In the late morning, the Subcontractor Electrical Foreman instructed an Electrical Apprentice to remove the temporary sealant from the two-inch conduit and pull wire through it. The Electrical Foreman believed that based on the morning briefing, he had obtained verbal Shift Supervisor approval to proceed with that task. He was not aware of the need to formally process a Gas Tight Penetration Approval Form because the primary Subcontractor Superintendent had always performed that function in the past. Caution tags had previously been hung on the conduit, only a few inches away from the temporary sealant, referencing the ATR Technical Specification and warning that removal of the temporary sealant was prohibited. The Electrical Apprentice was aware of the caution tags, but thought that the Shift Supervisor had given authorization to remove the seal and proceeded without contacting the Shift Supervisor. Had the Shift Supervisor been contacted, Operations personnel would have been requested to remove the caution tag; there was no provision on the caution tag for proceeding with removal of the seal with Shift Supervisor approval. The Subcontractor Electrical Foreman was not aware of the caution tag. The Shift Supervisor, under the assumption that Construction personnel were going to process the Penetration Approval Form, was not aware that the temporary sealant was being removed at that time; therefore, he had no opportunity to ensure and control compliance with the ATR Technical Specification. (continued) recognized that the Penetration Approval Form had not been processed, and requested that any further work on pulling wire through the conduit be stopped. Other Subcontractor work was allowed to continue.
OPERATING CONDITIONS OF FACILITY AT TIME OF OCCURRENCE:
The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) was operating at nominal Cycle 112A full power.
ACTIVITY CATEGORY: Construction
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TAKEN AND RESULTS:
Appropriate Operations and LMITCO Construction Project Line Management were notified of the problem. A critique of the problem was scheduled for later that day. Work related to pulling wire through electrical conduit that penetrated reactor confinement barriers remained on hold until the cause(s) could be determined and immediate corrective actions taken.
DIRECT CAUSE:
3) PERSONNEL ERROR
C. Communication Problem
CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S):
3) PERSONNEL A contributing cause is Personnel Error, Procedure Not Used or Used Incorrectly. The Subcontractor Superintendent understood the need to formally process the Penetration Approval Form for drilling holes through the confinement, and had done so numerous times in the past, when drilling holes through the confinement boundary for installation of piping and electrical conduit He did not process the form for the sub-tier Electrical Subcontractor, primarily due to inattention to detail, but also because he had not followed through on a question as to whether processing the form was required for only temporary removal of the conduit sealant, as opposed to the requirement for using the form for any drilling through confinement. He had intended to process the Penetration Approval Forms himself, if required, and had not briefed the sub-tier Electrical Subcontractor on use of the form.
LMITCO Construction personnel were fully aware of the need to process the Penetration Approval Forms, but like the Shift Supervisor, believed that the sub-tier Electrical Subcontractor was aware of the requirement and expected the form to be processed prior to removing the sealant from the electrical conduit.
The Electrical Apprentice indicated in a written statement that he had read the caution tag, but believed that his actions were allowed, even though they were not consistent with caution tag instructions. This belief was based on having received direction from his Electrical Foreman to proceed and knowing that a Shift Supervisor briefing had occurred that morning, with an approval to commence work.
Initially this event was believed to be an isolated case and the root cause was identified as Training Deficiency, Lack of Appropriate Training. The Subcontractor Electrical Foreman and the Electrical Apprentice were not aware of the Penetration Approval Form. The primary Subcontractor Superintendent indicated that the form had always been processed at his level, and above. The Electrical Apprentice was also not fully aware of the need to rigorously follow the caution tag instructions within the reactor facility, and if he could not, to request the caution tag be removed.
Subsequent related occurrences at ATR (ID-LITC-ATR-1997-000
on February 6,1997 and ID-LITC-ATR-1997-0008 on March 4, 1997) indicate that this event was not an isolated case and that the real root cause was construction subcontractor work control. Training Deficiency, Lack of Appropriate Training is now identified as a contributing cause. The Subcontractor failed to comply with the work control documents. This was not an intentional error, rather a lack of attention to detail on the part of the Electrical Superintendent, and a lack of training for the Electrical Foreman and the Electrical Apprentice. The pre-job briefing between the Subcontractor and the Shift Supervisor was broadbased and did not cover the specific approval forms that were necessary before removing gas tight penetration seals. The
Shift Supervisor did not understand that this was the first day on the job for the sub-tier Electrical Subcontractor and believed it to be unnecessarily repetitious to reiterate the need for processing the same form that the Subcontractor had used in excess of a hundred times before.
The breach opening through the reactor building confinement wall was well within the allowable Technical Specification limit of seven square inches, and there would have been no impact to the environment beyond that identifed in the Reactor Authorization Basis, even if a serious radiological airborne release had coincidentally occurred during the short time that the conduit sealant was removed. The Technical Specification action statement allowed openings greater than seven square inches to be created, as long as the openings were verified to be reduced to less than seven square inches within 24 hours.
Airborne activity levels were normal while this work was in progress, and in fact, would have precluded any construction work inside the reactor confinement if they had been elevated.
The process by which LMITCO executes work control associated with construction work inside a reactor operating facility needs to be reevaluated. There are numerous ways that the construction subcontractor can affect the safety of the facili. Construction work within the f a c i l i is carefully planned and reviewed with the LMITCO Construction Engineer each day, but the day-to-day details are not normally as well documented as for maintenance crafts. As such, other LMITCO personnel who are in the approval process for authorizing and/or overseeing the functional aspects of the work do not always understand the day-to-day details well enough to prevent errors, e.g., removal of sealant without proper authorization, failure to rigorously follow instructions on caution tags, methods for ensuring fall protection requirements are adhered to, methods for attaching unistrut to buildingcrane support columns are authorized, etc. On February 6, 1997, a LMlTCO Construction Engineer was performing a routine safety surveillance of construction work on the new Radioactive Waste Building that has been under construction since April 1996. An iron worker, working for a subtier construction contractor, was tack welding corrugated metal roof decking at prescribed one foot intervals on the 184. high vestibule porbion of the building (flat roof). The corrugated metal roof decking had been installed during previous weeks, with construction workers tied off as required, but follow-up tack weld spacing was required to meet construction specifications. The construction worker was on his knees, tack welding the deck and progressing from the center of the roof toward the edges; he was wearing a fall protection harness and was plus or minus a few inches of being within six feet from the edge of the roof. The construction worker's lanyard was not yet secured to the building main tie off point The LMITCO Construction Engineer brought it to the iron worker's attention that he was not properly tied off.
I S FURTHER EVALUATION
The iron worker stopped welding and asked for assistance from a co-worker to tie off his safety lanyard to the building main tie off point He indicated that he was aware of the requirement to tie off when he was within six feet of the edge of the roof and had intended to do so; there was no safety barrier or warning line on the roof that alerted him to where the six foot boundary was, and hence, where tieoff became mandatory. In the kneeling position, the worker was not in imminent danger of falling.
OSHA regulations require workers treat the entire roof as requiring tie-off unless some form of barrier or warning line is provided that alerts the worker to when they are within six feet of the edge of the roof. After properly securing his lanyard, the iron worker resumed welding.
OPERATING CONDITIONS OF FACILITY AT TIME OF OCCURRENCE:
The Radioactive Waste Storage Building was under construction with work in progress.
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ACTIVITY CATEGORY: Construction
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TAKEN AND RESULTS:
The LMITCO Construction Engineer notified the subcontractor project manager and the LMITCO Safety Engineer of the safety problem. An initial Safety Incident Notification Report was issued soon after the incident occurred, i.e., late in the day on February 6, 1997, thereby notifying higher levels of management within the LMITCO Construction Engineer's home organization and DOE-ID Construction representatives.
February 6,1997 was the last working day of the week, with three days scheduled off for most LMITCO personnel. Reportability of the event in the ORPS system was not considered at the time. As a result, Reactor Programs line management, who normally categorize events of this nature, and DOE-ID TRA Facility Representatives were not informed until the following Monday, and the event was not categorized within the required two hours. DOE-ID Facility Representatives became aware of the safety incident on February I O , 1997, while pursuing the initial Safety Incident Notification Report that was filed on the previous Thursday. When Reactor Programs line management was informed of the OSHA safety problem, the event was investigated on a one-on-one basis and subsequently categorized as an off-normal occurrence, with the initial notification report issued on the same day.
A safety meeting was held by the construction subcontractor on February 10,1997, emphasizing the importance of wearing the proper fall protection and the need to have a bamer or warning line in place to prevent inadvertently working closer than six feet from the edge of the roof without fall protection. A warning line was painted on the steel deck at seven feet from the edge of the roof, conservatively identifying the boundary for wearing fall protection.
A full critique of the event was conducted on February 20, 1997 to determine if there were other lessons to be learned from this event. At this critique, it was determined that a Safe Work Permit had been issued to control the elevated roof construction work. The Safe Work Permit (SWP) specified that personnel working on the roof installation be tied off, with no reference to the exercise of judgement when approaching 6 feet from the edge of the roof. It was apparent that construction subcontractor personnel were not in verbatim compliance with the SWP requirements. The direct cause for this event was Personnel Error, Procedure Not Used or Used Incorrectly. The iron worker that was tack welding the sections of corrugated roofing to roof beams should have been tied off in accordance with SWP requirements, since the SWP was not written to allow any deviation.
A contributing cause was a Procedure Problem, Defective or Inadequate Procedure. The SWP could have been more flexible in allowing some work in the center of the roof to be performed without being tied 0% however, if it was intended that some work be allowed without tieoff, the SWP should have addressed such issues as a safety barrier or warning line being pIaced a conservative distance (7 feet) from the roof edge, lanyard lengths for the odd configuration of the roof, etc.
The root cause was a Management Problem, Policy Not Adequately Defined, Disseminated, or Enforced. While the construction subcontractor for this job is a reputable firm with a good safety record, the subcontractor was not rigorously defining, disseminating, and enforcing SWP requirements to ensure 100 percent compliance. As a result, construction subcontractor personnel were not sensitive to the necessity for clearly communicating safety requirements in the SWP for ensuring verbatim compliance with the SWP, and for reviewing the safety requirements in detail during pre-job briefings.
EVALUATION: (By Facility ManagedDesignee)
There was potential for serious injury if the ironworker continued to weld past the six foot barrier and neared the edge of the roof with out fall protection. Since 1995, when a person died at another INEEL facility as a result of a fall, heavy emphasis has been placed by LMITCO on adhering to fall protection safety requirements. In this case, it is not known whether the iron worker had already or would have progressed beyond the six foot boundary. No safety boundary or warning line was in place to prevent that from occurring, and there were no provisions in the subcontractor SWP to allow any work on the roof to be performed without fall protection.
The SWP could have been used by the construction subcontractor as written, but was not. The LMITCO Construction Engineer was aware that the subcontractor was not wearing fall protection unless working closer than six feet from the edge of the roof, but was not aware that the Construction SWP required using fall protection for all elevated work. The current LMITCO SWP generation, review and approval process does not involve the LMITCO Construction Engineer; this is an apparent flaw in the process. The LMITCO Construction Engineer is the only LMITCO representative who has detailed knowledge of day-to-day activities and who provides day-to-day oversight of subcontractor work activities. As such, that person should be closely involved in all aspects of work control documentation review and approval to ensure pertinent questions have been asked. Questions, such as whether the right safety precautions have been taken, whether the precautions have been incorporated into the scheduled work activities andor whether work control documents accurateiy reflect planned work activities should be verified before the work control documents are routed to other LMITCO personnel who are in the review/approval process. More involvement in the SWP process by the Construction Engineer should provide added assurance that the full scope of planned work activities is understood and appropriate safety preventive measures are being taken.
I S FURTHER EVALUATION REQUIRED?:
26. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
= Date addedrevised since final report was signed off) 01) Conduct general safety training for all subcontractor personnel, with emphasis on wearing fall protection, tie off requirements for this job, rigorous adherence to SWP requirements, need for a questioning attitude during pre-job briefings as to how requirements apply to the job at hand, and a buddy system for looking out for fellow workers. (continued) construction subcontractor than the subcontractor that drilled holes in the 30-ton crane and diesel area crane runway support columns. Also it was apparent that over the years, some welding on the support columns had occurred for the purpose of attaching electrical conduit supports; records found to-date suggests that even though crane load testing has been performed since these modifications, some of the attachments were probably not previously formally analyzed.
The ATR 40-ton crane, 30-ton crane and diesel area cranes were tagged out, pending further evaluation of the problem. An engineering evaluation of these crane support showed that the holes were not at a critical location and would not have any significant effect on compressive, tensile, or bending loads.
A subsequent load test was successfully performed on these cranes before restoring them to service. The direct cause for one of the construction subcontractors having drilled holes in the 40 ton crane runway column supports was a Management Problem, Policy Not Adequately Defined, Disseminated, or Enforced. The subcontractor work control documents and drawings for the ATR Communication Upgrade construction project did not define any requirements that specified use of clamps to attach unistrut to the crane support columns, nor contain language alerting the subcontractor to the sensitivity of drilling/welding on the 40-ton crane column supports. Even though most of the electrical conduit that passed by the crane support columns were attached using clamps, this was not universally true, and some conduit supports were bolted or welded to the columns.
A contributing cause was a Personnel Error, procedure Not Used 
DESCRIPTION OF CAUSE:
(continued) apparently unilateral and unauthorized decision to drill into several crane support columns to attach unistrut The rationale used by this employee to make that decision is not known, since his employment with that construction subcontractor was terminated prior to conducting the critique.
The root cause for this event was a Management Problem, Inadequate Administrative Control. This event and two other recent reportable ATR occurrences supports a conclusion that LMITCO Reactor Programs personnel, who provide oversight of subcontractor work activities, are either not sufficiently involved in day-to-day detailed planning of the work, and/or are not sufficiently involved in daily work authorization to avoid problems that can directly affect reactor facility operations. LMITCO Safety and Operations has review and approval authority for daily work authorization but does not have detailed knowledge of day-to-day work activities. The LMITCO Construction Project Engineer has detailed knowledge of day-to-day activities but may not be adequately involved in authorizing work to start. At least in an operating reactor facilii, the construction engineer should be closely involved in all aspects of work control documentation reviewlapproVal to ensure pertinent questions have been asked. Questions, such as whether the right safety precautions have been taken, whether the precautions have been incorporated into the scheduled work activities andlor whether work control documents accurately reflect planned work activities should be verified before the work control documents are routed to other interested LMITCO personnel who are in the reviewlapproval process. This involvement would provide added assurance that the full scope of planned work activities is understood and appropriate persanneWacilii safety preventive measures are being taken.
In addition, the fact that one subcontractor work control document contained language prohibiting drilling of building crane column supports, but another controlling essentially the same type of construction work in the same reactor facilii did not, suggests there may be a deficiency in consistently defining reactor specitic construction subcontractor work control requirements in the subcontracts. This deficiency should be addressed as part of Corrective Action (02).
EVALUATION: (By Facility Managermesignee)
Engineering analysis showed that all holes drilled in the various ATR crane support columns by the two construction subcontractors did not cause any weakening of the columns that would limit its original intended design function. If for some reason, there had been compelling reasons for the construction subcontractors to request an engineering evaluation to allow drilling holes of the size and at the same location that they were drilled instead of using damps, the (continued)
The focus of this report has been on the consequence of drilling into crane support columns because crane modifications require an engineering analysis and/or follow-up crane load testing to meet DOE Hoisting and Rigging Standards; however, drilling and welding on any building support column could have significant consequences. Labeling of crane support columns throughout the building was considered but subsequently dropped as a possible corrective action because of the possibility that it could lead to the belief that drilling into other building support columns is acceptable without prior analysis. Small holes in a strategic location can cause stress risers and/or alter structural safety factors in the unlikely event of an earthquake.
A backwards looking engineering evaluation of other unistrut supports attached to the ATR building structural supports needs to be performed where supporting documentation that authorizes these modifications cannot be found. Work control and/or an awareness of the potential impact of drilling into building and crane supports must also be confirmed or provided for those personnel who are in a position to modify the supports or to control authorization for the modification work. As an interim work control measure, drilling by subcontract personnel on any building walls or supports has been prohibited without prior Shift Supervisor approval. This control measure does not apply to TRA Maintenance crafts since the Maintenance crafts perform work in accordance to pre-approved detailed planning instructions. Appropriate LMITCO Line Management and DOE-ID were notified of the event Follow-up investigation of the halon pipe distribution system configuration inside the building showed that each spiral discharge nozzle had an orifice installed inside each nozzle, limiting the cross-sectional area of the pipe to .441 square inches, and the total cross sectional area of all eight spiral discharge nozzles was 3.53 square inches instead of 8.8 square inches. As such, it was determined that ATR had not actually entered a Technical Specification action statement, as earlier believed, but it was only fortuitous that it had not. The Reactor Operations Manager directed that any further work on this construction subcontract be discontinued until the cause is determined and compensatory actions taken to prevent a future similar occurrence.
IS FURTHER EVALUATION REQUIRED
A critique of the event was scheduled on October 27,1997, to review work control issues that allowed the halon piping to be removed during reactor operation without ensuring the penetrations were immediately resealed. Results of the critique and investigation of this event will be reported in the final report.
EVALUATION: (By Facility ManagerlDesignee)
The opening through the reactor building confinement wall was within the Technical Specification allowable limit of seven square inches; however, work controls for construction subcontractor work were not effective in preventing the ATR gas-tight confinement from being inadvertently breached. Maintaining gas-tight confinement within allowable leakage limits specified in the ATR Technical Specifications is important to prevent a serious radiological release from the ATR building. The probability of a serious radiological release occurring in the twenty-five minutes between time of discovery and the time that the pipe penetrations were sealed, is extremely low. As identified in the ATR Technical Specification action statement, continued reactor operation was justified, if the pipes penetrations could be sealed within 24 hours. The halon system pipes were open for approximately 92 hours before being discovered as a potential gas-tight confinement problem.
